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  Abstract
If new environmental regulation imposes significant costs on firms, it should be detected in their
stock prices.  We use event study methodology to analyze whether President George H. Bush’s Clean
Air Act Amendment (CAAA) proposals of June 1989, which were quite different from what had been
expected, depressed stock prices in affected electricity generating and coal mining companies.  We find
that shares of 35 electric generating companies owning Phase I power plants did not noticeably fall in
value after the Bush June 1989 announcement, nor after three other possibly relevant events during the
preceding year.  In fact, these shares increased in value during June and July of 1989.  In contrast,
stock prices of 11 of the 12 coal mining companies fell after Bush announced his proposals, while stock
prices of a large majority of these coal companies fell after two of the other three events (although
significance levels make these results not entirely conclusive). We argue that expected profits of electric
generating companies did not fall because the regulated price of electricity was typically allowed to
increase with costs.  In the electricity industry, the costs of the CAAA were expected to be borne
entirely by consumers in the form of higher prices.-1-
I.  Introduction
Compliance with environmental regulation is costly.  Therefore, new environmental legislation
should hurt the future profitability of polluting companies.  Economists have pursued different
approaches to document financial impacts of environmental legislation on polluting companies and
industries, with mixed results.  Since share prices reflect the net present value (NPV) of future profits, a
direct way to measure financial markets’ expectations of the profitability impacts of new environmental
legislation is to examine how share prices respond to its passage.  This event-study approach has not
been taken in the past because successful legislation typically unfolds over months or even years, with
the likelihood of its passage gradually increasing over this period.  Consequently, it is impossible to
separate the impact of regulation from the myriad of other factors affecting companies. 
However, occasionally specific events suddenly and radically increase the likelihood of a law’s
passage, making it conceivable to discern any sudden abnormal negative movements in share prices of
polluting companies.  In this paper, we argue that such an event occurred on June 12th, 1989, when
President George H. Bush surprised the markets by announcing proposed Clean Air Act Amendments
(CAAA) quite different from what had been expected even a few days previous.  The acid rain sections
of the proposed legislation would have increased the costs of a limited group of electric generating
companies – those owning Phase I power plants required to lower polluting emissions within five years. 
Since one way to comply with this new clean air legislation was to substitute from high to low sulphur
coal, expectations of the demand for high sulphur coal-mining companies similarly would have fallen
radically as a result of this announcement, lowering their share prices as well.
These two industries – electricity generation and coal mining – operated in very different2With rate-of-return regulation, price increases would also counteract any revenue impact of demand
responses.  The key exception to complete cost pass-throughs were cost overruns at nuclear construction
projects.  Note that beginning in 1998, some states began deregulating the electricity generation industry. 
All electricity firms analyzed in this paper were regulated during period studied.
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environments in 1989.  During the eighties and nineties, the price of electricity was controlled at both
the wholesale electricity-generation stage and at the retail electricity stage by governmental regulatory
bodies. Regulators typically allowed generators and utilities to pass-through both capital and fuel cost
increases to consumers in the form of price hikes.2  While the proposed clean air legislation would
increase costs for the impacted electricity generators, if the electricity regulators allowed complete
pass-through of these higher costs such that the return on capital remained constant, share prices of the
electric generating companies would have had little reaction to the June 12th event.  In contrast, coal-
mining companies were unregulated and, unlike electricity companies, were not subject to the same
regulatory constraints when maximizing profits. Therefore, coal-mining firms did not have the ability to
pass through reductions in profits through higher regulated prices.  Since substitutes exist (including low
sulphur coal) for the medium and high sulphur coal restricted by the proposed CAAA, we would
expect profits of these firms to fall.
In addition to studying stock price movements around the June 12th, 1989 Bush speech, this
paper considers three events in the preceding year that may also have caused a sudden and hence
measurable change in the probability of new acid rain regulations: (1) Bush’s first major environmental
campaign speech (August 31, 1988) followed the next day by his famous attack on Dukakis’s dirty
Boston Harbor, (2) the election itself (November 8, 1988), and (3) the January 31, 1989 speech of the
nominated EPA director William Reilly indicating the administration’s commitment to immediately
develop and support an acid-rain proposal.  Using event study methodology, we look at abnormal
stock returns in the period surrounding all four of these dates.   The next section gives a short review of
the work on environmental regulation and profitability.  Section III then discusses the four different-3-
events culminating in the Presidential submission of the proposed Clean Air Act Amendment.  The
empirical event study appears in Section IV.  Summarizing our findings, we do indeed find that many of
these events seemed to depress stock prices of several  Eastern coal mining companies, while tending
to have a zero or  positive effect on the Phase I electricity generating plants.  Section V discusses
interpretations of these findings. 
II.  Literature on Environmental Impacts on Profitability
Within the environmental economics literature, a variety of approaches have been used to
understand the impact of environmental legislation on industries and firms. Most of this literature does
not look at profit changes directly, but instead measures the impact of environmental regulation on a
variety of company decisions.  When companies change their behavior in response to regulations,
standard neoclassical theory suggests that they must of necessity be departing from their profit
maximizing choices.  Many recent authors find that environmental regulation does deter plant/company
location and entry and encourage exit  (for instance, Becker and Henderson 2000, Biorn et al. 1998,
Dean et al. 2000, Greenstone 1998, Gray and Shadbegian 1998, List and Co 2000) although impacts
are typically small, while some studies of the 70s and 80s (reviewed in Jaffe et al. 1995) find no
statistically significant effect.
Michael Porter has suggested that “properly designed environmental standards can trigger
innovation that may partially or more than fully offset the costs of complying with them.”  (Porter 1995
p.98)  Others dispute that this is typically true, based on empirical studies of research and development
(for instance, Jaffe and Palmer 1997).
Productivity also may be affected by environmental regulation.  Early studies considering
productivity impacts found that 8% to16% of the decline in 1970's manufacturing productivity was due-4-
to environmental legislation.  (Studies reviewed in Jaffe et al. 1995.)    More recently  Berman and Bui
(2001) find that environmental regulation of oil refining increased productivity, presumably by requiring
new state-of-the-art investments, while Boyd and McClelland (1999) find environmental constraints on
paper plants decreased the per unit materials needs while not affecting labor productivity.  Of course,
even if both labor and materials productivity increase, this does not indicate increased NPV because
the initial capital costs of new investments must be factored in as well.   Related literature measures
costs of environmental regulation.  A recent article in this vein is Becker and Henderson (1999), which
finds 10% - 18% higher manufacturing costs in areas with stringent environmental relations.
One study that addresses profitability directly with cross-sectional data is  Austin, Alberini and
Videras (1999).  In any cross sectional study of profitability and environmental regulation, omitted
variables are likely to bias results.  This paper deals with this bias by trying to identify causality using
lags, but is unable to identify any particular direction of causality.  Other authors have studied
profitability changes in response to regulatory changes (for instance, Chiles and Clark 1999).
There have been a handful of event studies in environmental economics.  These papers have
primarily considered the impact on share prices of news about a company’s poor environmental
performance (e.g. Harper and Adams 1996, Laplante and Lanoie 1994, Khanna, Quimo and Bojilova
1998) rather than the market impact of passage of the environmental regulation itself.
The present study uses the event study methodology to look for abnormal stock returns
resulting from surprising events which lead to eventual passage of new environmental legislation. An
event study of environmental regulation has advantages over other approaches.  It is far less likely than
cross-sectional analysis to be affected by reverse causality or omitted variables bias.  In addition, it
addresses the profitability issue directly, rather than considering plant location and other indirect impacts
or considering productivity but ignoring capital costs.3 Many facts in this section are from Cohen’s (1992) detailed history of the political process culminating in
passage of the Clean Air Act of 1990.  The rest of the history is taken from reports in the popular and
industry press (mad available from Lexis/Nexis) as well as from public records of Bush’s speeches, press
releases and the bill itself as submitted on July 21, 1989.
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III.  The Evolution of the Clean Air Act of 19903
Throughout the 1980's, environmentally-conscious members of the House and the Senate tried
to pass amendments to the Clean Air Act to expand the 1970 Clean Air Act and its 1977
Amendments, in order to address a variety of new or continuing air quality concerns including acid rain,
urban air quality, toxic pollutants and vehicle pollution.  President Reagan did not support new
environmental regulation, and Congress was sufficiently divided to create a stalemate, despite the fact
that 1987 was the lapsed deadline for local areas to comply with clean-air standards.  After George H.
Bush and Michael Dukakis emerged from the primaries as the presidential nominees in spring of 1988,
few expected whichever candidate won to quickly and vigorously pursue acid rain legislation. 
However, by August of 1989, there was near universal certainty that some such legislation would pass
likely to impose additional costs on the dirtiest power plants.  What during the ensuing year caused this
change?
With Dukakis leading in the polls, George H. Bush needed to attract moderate independent
voters in key states.  On August 31st, 1988, breaking from the Reagan past, Bush positioned himself as
an environmentalist who planned to address the acid rain issue and other environmental problems early
in his Presidency.  The following day he gave his famous Boston Harbor speech, attacking Dukakis’s
environmental record.  Market observers may have interpreted these speeches as a signal of increased
likelihood of environmental regulation of electric power plants.  On the other hand, expectations may
have changed little because it was only a campaign promise and therefore of little value, and because of
Republicans’ general tendency to prefer business incentives to command-and-control regulation. -6-
Indeed, judging by accounts in the contemporaneous general and industry press, during the campaign
people were uncertain whether Bush would follow through on his campaign promise to make the
environment a priority. After the previous Clean Air Act Amendments died in Congress in October,
Senator Rudman ruminated that “It might be another eight years before something (about clean air)
happens again,” while Senator Mitchell agreed that “It may not be next year or the year after that.  But
ultimately it will happen.” (Boston Globe, October 5, 1988.)  
The election outcome may have changed probabilities of new acid rain regulation, but during the
week before the election news analysts could not predict which candidate would make such regulation
more likely.  “Who is the Cleanest Mr. Clean?” Newsday asked four days before the election.  (Mark
McIntyre, Newsday, November 3, 1988.)  While Dukakis’s platform included the goals for SO2 and 
NOx  reduction incorporated within the CAAA that had just failed in October, Bush also sought
reductions of "millions of tons" of these of acid-rain precursors, but within some kind of market-based
context.  Nevertheless, most environmentalists preferred Dukakis, while most business and industry
leaders preferred Bush's environmental views. 
Uncertainty about whether, and when, Bush would act on acid rain and what these actions
would entail continued during the period between the election and the inauguration.  The January edition
of Coal reported on the coal industry’s expectations.  While the industry seemed to expect some acid
rain legislation in the next Congress, they were "cautiously optimistic" that the Bush administration would
back clean-coal technology development but would not back emissions controls that would impose
large costs on both the coal and the electric utility industry.  The January 5th Public Utilities
Fortnightly reported that, “Opinions vary regarding the changes of reauthorization of the Clean Air
Act” and itself assumed that Bush would pursue clean-coal technology rather than emissions control. 
On the eve of the inauguration, an editorial in the January 19th Engineering News-Record read, “The-7-
appetizers on Bush’s environmental plate should be clean air and acid rain legislation..... The question
is, will the gargantuan deficit stifle the new President’s appetite?”  Thus, there was considerable
uncertainty about whether Bush would propose any Clean Air Act at all, and most people in the
industry seemed convinced that any approach Bush would take would not include new controls.  
The first clear signal that the Bush administration was planning to act on the Clean Air Act
Amendments – and particularly acid rain – came in a speech by the EPA director, William Reilly, at his
confirmation hearings on January 31, 1989.  In this speech, Reilly promised that acid rain controls
would be ‘first out of the box’ of White House legislative proposals.  He gave no additional details
about who would pay for improvements, what level of reductions were intended or how improvements
would be pursued.  A spokesperson from the industry association Edison Electric Institute expressed
little concern, citing the difficulty in drafting a bill that would pass Congress (Thomas Spears, The
Toronto Star, February 2, 1989.)  
Bush continued to signal that he was planning action on acid rain.  In his budget speech to
Congress on February 9, he personally promised that “I will send to you shortly legislation for a new,
more effective Clean Air Act.”   He specifically asked for $385 million more in the new budget for acid
rain cleanup (Walter Robinson and Stephen Kurkjian, The Boston Globe, February 10, 1989).  At the
same time, he assured the utility industry that utilities would be able to choose the “least cost”
compliance method. This commitment to acid rain legislation was reiterated at a February 10th meeting
with Canada’s Prime Minister and in Reilly interviews with ABC and USA Today later that month.
Although behind the scenes, a high-level cross-department team was working intensely on designing this
legislation, there were no leaks on specifics reported in the media. 
Beyond occasional statements from Reilly and others that any acid rain legislation would allow
industry to choose least-cost methods through market forces, there were no concrete developments on4This circulation did not occur on a precise date.  Cohen (1992) reports that the White House staff
circulated the draft to interested parties over a period of several days.    
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acid rain made public by the White House for almost three months. Judging from reports in the press,
people increasingly expected some acid rain legislation that would in some way regulate utilities.  By
May, the expectations were that Bush would unveil his environmental proposals within a month.  Yet as
late as the week of June 5th, industry groups still did not know details of Bush’s plan.  On Friday June
9th, government sources started leaking some of the details of the plan, including emissions controls at
the dirtiest power plants.  Even then, these sources said that Bush was still deciding whether to further
regulate the 20 worst or the 100 worst power plants. 
Bush revealed his proposal on June 12, 1989.   White House press releases describing the
proposal’s details said that 107 older power plants with SO2 emissions greater than 2.5 pounds per
million BTU’s would be regulated in the first phase of increased acid rain controls beginning in 1995. 
Phase II, beginning in 2000, would further lower emissions standards to 1.2 pounds and affect an
additional 200 power plants.  The Bush proposal allowed these power plants to achieve emissions
goals at least cost through a market system of tradable allowances to emit SO2 and  NOx pollution.
Over the next 6 weeks, both industry and environmental groups lobbied to change the details of
the President’s proposal.  During the first week of July, the administration circulated a written draft
legislative proposal to interested parties to elicit their feedback on the specifics.4  As a result of this
feedback as well as additional internal negotiations, some details of the bill were changed. On July 21st,
the Bush administration submitted its proposed legislation to Congress.  
After July 21st, the legislature wended its course through Congressional committees, the floor of
the House and Senate, and the Conference Committee. Various compromises and deals were struck. 
The list of Phase I power plants changed repeatedly.  The process essentially ended October 22, 1990,
the day that the conference committee agreed on a compromise between the House and Senate5Those interested in learning more about the events between July 1989 and October 1990 can refer to
Cohen (1992).  For details on the subsequent history of the CAAA acid rain regulations and the market
for emission allowances, see Ellerman et al. 2000.
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versions.5  Figure 1 summarizes the major events described above. The process took twenty-one
months from the first statement of intention at the end of January 1989 through its final adoption. 
Throughout that period, informed investors continued to revise upward their estimate of the likelihood
that the dirtiest power plants would face substantial emissions controls.
However, as early as the end of July 1989, contemporaneous reports indicated that the industry
press and investment analysts believed it almost certain that Congress would adopt acid rain legislation
affecting these 107 worst power plants and that the form would be very similar to that in Bush’s
proposed legislation.   These provisions of the acid rain legislation were expected to impose a
considerably financial burden on the companies, particularly if these power plants comprised a large
percentage of the company’s total business.  Within a year, the probability of these 107 power plants
being subject to new costly regulation had moved from very low levels to close to 100%.
The event study in the next section analyzes the four major events of that year discussed above,
each of which may have led people to make sudden re-evaluations of their priors on the likelihood of
acid rain legislation. The four events windows are:
1.  Bush’s August 31st and September 1st, 1988  environmental campaign speeches.
2.  The presidential election of November 8, 1988.
3.  Reilly’s January 31st, 1989 speech on Bush environmental priorities.
4.  Bush’s June 12th, 1989 speech announcing his Clean Air legislative package, and its subsequent July
21st submission.
Given the historical record, we hypothesize that of the four events, the June 12th, 1989 Bush
speech is most likely to have had a measurable cumulative abnormal return, or CAR. 6Obtained from http://cnnfn.marketguide.com/mgi/. We could not use the cnnfn index itself, since it
includes many of the electricity and coal companies we are modeling.  Instead, we construct our own
index averaging the rates of return of the companies in the cnnfn, excluding (a) companies that own
Phase I power plants or coal mines (b) companies either going public or leaving standard stock exchanges
during the study period and (c) companies with low share prices and hence large swings in returns
representing only changes of a single tick.
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Since relevant information was revealed across the entire 6 week period between this speech and
submission of the proposal to the legislature in late July, we consider two versions of window 4, one
based on the speech only and the other based on both the speech and submission.  The election is likely
to have had the least impact of the four events, since people were unclear on which candidate would
move most quickly on acid rain.
IV.  Event Study Analysis 
A. Data and Methodology
Event studies predict expected stock returns as a function of overall market returns over an
extended period called the estimation window, and use this to calculate any abnormally high or low
returns during the event window.  
In our study, market returns are measured by the S&P 500 index.  In the electricity analysis,
we also use a market index of electric utilities’ returns.  We constructed this index for electric utilities
based on the companies listed in the CNNfn’s Market Guide electric utilities sector, eliminating both the
companies we analyze in this paper and other companies with data problems.6 
Standard procedure in event studies is to begin each event window five trading days prior to
the event to allow for the possibility of prior information leakages, and extend it ten trading days
following the event to allow time for informed shareholders to learn about the event and analyze its
implications, and for markets to equilibrate.  We have adopted this general procedure except for the
“June 12, 1989 speech through July 21 legislative submission” window, where we include not only the-11-
5 prior and 10 subsequent trading days, but also the entire period between these dates.  Table 1 lists
the windows and gives additional details about the event study.  
Besides measuring cumulative abnormal returns for each of the four windows separately, we
also measure abnormal returns for all four event windows combined, in case this longer period captures
the changed market sentiment caused by all of the above events combined even though each
company’s stock may have adjusted at only some of these events.   In this “all windows” specification,
intermediate periods between the four event windows are dropped, since they are likely to add noise
due to other contemporaneous incidents that would swamp any small changes in expectations of
environmental regulation.
The estimation period, the period over which we measure the normal relationship between each
stock and market returns, covers the year prior to the earliest of these 4 events. From this year, we
have cut out nineteen observations of atypical market movements surrounding Black Monday (October
19, 1987), and added an additional 19 observations in the beginning of the window, so that the
estimation window begins on July 28, 1987.   One coal company, Ashland Coal, traded publicly
beginning in August 1988.  CARs for this company were estimated separately from the other
companies, with a shorter estimation window, and only for events beginning with and subsequent to the
election in 1988.
Some event studies include the time period after the event as part of their estimation window.  
We do not, both because the relationship of share prices to the overall stock market may have been
permanently changed by the events studied and because there were further developments regarding
acid rain legislation after our “final” event window, culminating in the passage of the conference report’s
version of the Clean Air Act Amendments on October 27th, 1990.  
Originally, event studies in finance separated the estimation of the market relationship from the7One of the first papers to take this approach was Binder, 1985. MacKinlay, 1997, discusses general
issues in the estimation of event studies. 
8Specifically, we estimate the CARs with a seemingly unrelated regression of the separate companies
within each industry over all estimation and event period observations.    These returns are regressed on
the S&P 500 returns and on a dummy variable for each event day t.  The dummy variable takes on a
value of 1 on day t and -1 on the previous day.   Using this method, the coefficient on the t’th dummy is
the CAR from the event’s start until time t and its standard error accurately measured.  Because of the
large dimensionality with some of the windows considered here, we often estimate in two stages using the
Frisch/Waugh/Lovell method of partialing out the effect of the CAR. 
9Many of these companies have since merged with others. 
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measurement of the abnormal returns.  More recently many authors have combined these two steps to
aid in calculation of correct standard errors.  This is accomplished by including as observations all days
in either the estimation or event windows and capturing the event’s impact by a right-hand-side
indicator variable for days within the event window.  The coefficient of the indicator variable is
interpreted as the abnormal return.7  This method, however, can lead to incorrect estimation since the
normal market relationship is estimated based on days within the event window as well as days within
the earlier estimation window. However, as Salinger (1992) points out, the event itself may alter the
relationship between market and company returns during the event window, biasing the coefficients. 
The bias would be particularly problematic for long event windows.  We instead use the approach
suggested Salinger (1992) which requires separate dummy variables for each day during the event
window.8  While this vastly increases the dimensionality of the estimation, it allows accurate
measurement of the event’s impact and its standard error. 
We study abnormal returns during these events for 12 publicly owned companies coal mining
companies and 35 publicly-owned companies electricity generating companies9.   Each of the 35
electricity generating companies owned one or more of the 107 Phase I power plants named in the bill
submitted by President Bush to Congress on July 21st, 1989.  Daily end-of-day share prices for each
company were obtained from the CRSP data base.  We estimate the CARs in each industry as a10Power plants were located in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and
Wisconsin. A minority of the 107 power plants were owned by private companies or governmental
units such as the Tennessee Valley Authority; because these were not publicly traded, they could not be
included in our analysis.  
11Obtained from Lexis/Nexis.
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seemingly unrelated regression of the separate companies.  
The amount of electricity generated by these companies ranged from 2.1 billion KWh per year
to 137.0 billion KWh per year.  The power plants were generally situated in a vertical swathe of the US
from Wisconsin and Michigan in the North to Georgia and Alabama in the South, areas from which
SO2 and  NOx can drift eastward and create acid rain.  Some Eastern and Southern states also had the
dubious distinction of appearing in this list.10  Many of these 35 companies owned several Phase I
power plants, often in several different locations.  Often, they also owned non-Phase I power plants as
well.  Finally, some of these 35 companies also operated other businesses besides electricity generation
–  most commonly natural gas utilities.
Some specifications described in the results use the percentage of company revenues generated
by Phase I power plants. The calculation of this percentage was straightforward for companies whose
only business was electricity generation.  For these companies, we calculated the percentage of
electricity produced in Phase I  plants as a proportion of all electricity generated by the company. 
Electricity generated at the Phase I power plants were taken from the FERC Form 1 Data.  The
companies’ total electricity generation was obtained from their Annual Reports to Shareholders or 10K
reports to the SEC.11
For companies that did other business in addition to electricity generation, the percentage of
total revenue was calculated by multiplying the percentage of the company’s electricity generation in12Revenue figures by plant or unit were not available.  Note that these figures were from 1989, before the
legislation was passed.
13This excludes, among other categories, stocks traded over-the-counter, stocks traded on the pacific
exchange, privately held companies, etc. 
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Phase I plants by the percent of company revenues derived from electricity sales.12    The 12 publicly
owned coal mining companies were chosen on the basis of data availability – they had to be traded on
a stock exchange with historical CRSP data13 and to be companies where coal was not a minuscule
part of the company’s business.
Some specifications required a measure of the percentage of the coal mining companies’
revenues from high and medium sulphur coal.  The revenues from coal as a percent of total revenues
were obtained from companies’ Annual Reports to Shareholders or 10K reports to the SEC.  The
proportion of the coal mined by the company that had high or medium sulphur content was more
difficult to quantify, and was based on descriptions in Annual Reports to Shareholders,  other reports
about the companies’ prospects, and as a last resort by the location of the mines themselves, since
sulphur content differs by region.
B.  Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) 
Electric Generating Companies
Tables 2 and 3 summarize results of the event study of the various windows between August
1988 and August 1989 for electricity and coal companies respectively.  The estimation in Table 2 
predicts movements in the 35 electric generating companies’ share prices based on their recent
historical relationship to returns of both the S&P500 index and to the index of electric utilities
(described earlier).  The latter variable ensures that we are measuring movements in these 35 Phase I
companies’ share prices as they differed from other companies in the electricity industry, thus14Note that this does not constrain all companies to have the same cumulative abnormal return for any day
in the event window except the final one.  This corresponds to the assumption that the market implications
for the different companies affected may be revealed at different points in time.
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controlling for factors affecting the whole industry. Note that this method would not capture any impact
the events had on the entire electricity industry.  However, results of estimation controlling only for the
S&P 500 (available from authors) do not qualitatively differ from estimation with both controls in Table
2.  
Four of the 35 Phase I companies also owned coal mines.  Share prices of these four
companies may reflect impacts of events on both industries and are reported separately from the other
31 companies.  
The first row of Table 2 gives details about the cumulative abnormal return over all four
different events combined into a single window.   Of the 35 company coefficients, very few were
statistically significant.  In fact, only 3 of the 35 had t statistics greater than 1. More of the companies
(21=18+3) had positive points estimates of the CAR than had negative ones (13+1).   All four of the
companies in electricity generation and coal mining businesses simultaneously had coefficients essentially
zero (p-value > .5).   The mode in Figure 2a, a histogram of the company coefficients from the
combined events, is slightly above zero and the overall distribution seems to be relatively symmetric
around this near-zero point.
In a separate specification, the estimation was constrained to require that the impact of events
on the expected profits of the Phase I plants were identical.  Since the Phase I plants represented very
different percentages of the company, the constraint imposed identical CARs had the Phase I plants
represented 100% of revenues.14  The constraint did not encompass the 4 companies in the coal and
electricity businesses simultaneously, since they are expected to respond differently than the other 31. 
The results are in the first column of Table 2.  The positive coefficient of .0360 in the first row15For instance, if a Phase I plant represents .2 of the company owning it and has a 1% abnormal return,
the “as-if-100%” abnormal return would be 1/.2 or 5%.
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represents this single CAR, expressed as if the Phase I plants comprised 100% of the company.15  In
other words, these clean air act developments overall increased the share prices of these 31 electric
generating companies by 3.6%.   This coefficient, with a p-value of .48, is not differentiable from zero.  
A Wald test does not reject the joint constraints.
The remaining rows of Table 2 present results for each of the four separate events.  We had
hypothesized that if the CAAA was bad news for the Phase I companies, negative abnormal returns
would be observed for the fourth event window, and perhaps for the first and third event windows as
well since they each contained events that increased the likelihood of power plant emissions regulation. 
On the other hand, we had no clear prediction on the election’s impact.  Looking at the single
constrained coefficients in the first column to get a general sense of the events’ impacts, nothing
preceding Bush’s June 12th, 1989 announcement of his proposed acid rain legislation had a significant
impact, with p-values all greater than .5.   
The rest of the columns in the table give some information on the estimated CARs of separate
companies in unconstrained analysis.  Again considering the first three windows, more companies’
stock prices reacted negatively – some at marginally significant levels – than reacted positively, to
Bush’s summer 1988 environmental campaign speeches.  Reactions to the election window and to
Reilly’s January 1989 confirmation speech were more mixed and ambiguous.  A few of the negative
company impacts from these earlier windows but none of the positive ones achieved statistical
significance.  Finally, share prices of the four companies in coal and electricity generation
simultaneously, described in the farthest right columns, did not seem to react to any of the events.
However, the fourth window, the June 12th speech and subsequent Bush legislative submission,
brought the 31 (non-coal) companies significantly positive abnormal returns, with a p-value of .061 for16Here, too, a Wald test does not reject the constrained model.
17This calculation is made using a binomial distribution and assuming that the coefficients are not
correlated.
-17-
the constrained coefficient in variant b (the window including both speech and submission) and .150 in
the 16 days around the speech alone.16   No estimate of separate company CARs had reached this
significance level for either window variant, but 23 (a) or 25 (b) of the 31 companies with positive point
estimates combined to generate overall statistical significance.  One way to evaluate the likelihood of
this number of companies with positive CARs is to calculate the probability of this result assuming the
following: the true average impact is zero, but there is a 50% chance of getting a positive or negative
result respectively.  In this case, the likelihood of getting 25 or more positives out of 31 trials is a mere
.00044.17  
Coal Mining Companies
Table 3 presents results of the coefficients from a similar analysis for coal mining companies.  
They stand in stark contrast to the results for electricity generating companies.  Stocks of  9 of 11 coal
companies (82%) had negative cumulative reactions to the four events combined  (1st row).  Four of
these 9 companies have p-values <11% while a fifth has a more ambiguous 20% p-value.  Figure 2b
illustrates the predominant negative and large impact of these events, quite different from the preceding
histogram of electricity CARs.
Which specific events impacted coal companies, and was the impact of each event negative? 
Again, the presidential election’s impact was almost evenly divided between positive and negative
impacts (with 58% negative coefficients), although only the negative impacts had any statistically
significant results.   For each of the other three events, negative impacts predominate, suggesting that
the markets interpreted these events as bad news for these coal companies. The June 12th speech and
subsequent submission was again the most extreme event, in the sense that 11 of the 12 companies18This second effect would imply that for companies owning coal reserves with diverse sulphur content,
the separate negative impact on the company from owning high sulphur coal is higher than the estimated
CAR suggests.
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experienced negative cumulative abnormal returns.  If the true average CAR during this event window
was 0, and positive and negative coefficients equally expected, the likelihood of at least 11 being
negative was .00317.
To calculate a single coefficient for all (11) companies, we made very rough estimates of the
percentage of the companies’ revenues derived from medium to high sulphur coal as opposed to either
low sulphur coal or other businesses.  With these estimates, we constrained the CARs to be equal if the
high/medium versus low sulphur part of the company had instead been 100%.  Far less faith should be
put in these numbers than in the constrained CARs for electricity, because accurate estimates of the
percentage high/medium sulphur coal were not available, and because this approach ignores any
positive impact likely to be experienced by sellers of low sulphur coal.18  For the four events combined,
the constrained impact is estimated to be negative, with a p-value of .23 and a whopping point estimate
of -28.75%.   For the June/July 1989 speech/submission window, the point estimate is much smaller
and indistinguishable from zero (-3.0 %, p-value=.85), despite 11 negative coefficients.   Dropping the
single company with a positive value, Pyro Energy Corporation, transforms the overall CAR point
estimate to a much larger -22.2% with a p-value of .226.
Summarizing, shares of the electric generating companies owning Phase I power plants did not
noticeably fall in value during any of the events up to and including George H. Bush’s submission of his
proposed Clean Air Act Amendments.  In fact, these shares increased in value during Bush’s
announcement and submission of his specific legislative proposal listing Phase I power plants, suggesting
that the Bush proposal was if anything good rather than bad news to these companies.  In contrast,
stock prices of coal mining companies predominantly fell.  19We realize that a large literature exists beginning with Joskow (1974) that questions this view, giving
evidence that profits are not always constrained to be at the allowed rate of return. However, even if
profits are allowed to deviate from the allowed rate of return over small time periods, a large decline in
expected profits induced by new acid rain legislation would likely trigger a rate hearing, resulting in the
pass-through of cost increases.
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V.  Interpreting These Results
In this paper, we have analyzed the effect of an unexpected increase in the likelihood of acid
rain legislation on the two industries most likely to be adversely affected, the electricity and coal-mining
industries.  We use the impact on share prices of a sudden shift in George H. Bush’s environmental
focus to measure how this new legislation was expected to influence the profitability of firms within
these industries. 
The different market environments in which electricity and coal-mining firms operate provide us
with a useful comparison of the effects of environmental legislation on regulated and unregulated firms.
In 1989, electricity firms operated under a strict regulatory regime, where prices, and to a large extent
profits, were tightly regulated.  In contrast, coal-mining firms were able to maximize profits free from
such constraints. 
A priori, we would expect increases in environmental legislation to have vastly different effects
on these two industries.  Indeed, we would expect environmental legislation that made medium and high
sulphur coal a less attractive input into electricity generation to have a clear negative effect on firms that
mined medium and high sulphur coal (although any simultaneous ownership of low sulphur mines might
counteract some or all of this effect).
Conversely, electricity firms operate in a rate-of-return regulatory environment, where
regulators set prices so firms can earn a “normal” rate of return. Thus, prices are set below the profit-
maximization level but above the break-even level. Therefore, if electricity firms are always at or near
this normal rate of return, any increases in costs will be entirely passed through to consumers.19  -20-
Furthermore, if electric utilities were not regulated but allowed to set profit-maximizing prices, electricity
demand’s inelasticity would nevertheless once again place the great bulk of the burden on electricity
consumers.  Therefore, we would expect new environmental legislation to have a small impact, if any,
on the profitability of electricity firms. 
Our empirical results confirm our priors. We find that, on average, electricity firms were not
adversely affected by the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990, while coal-mining firms were.
In particular, we find that only one of the 35 firms owning Phase 1 electricity generating plants had a
statistically significant response to the evolution of the legislation and that this response was positive,
rather than negative.  Indeed, fewer than half of the firms (fourteen) had negative coefficients. The
analysis of the separate major events during this time suggests the same, with the most marked market
response being after the Bush June 12th speech announcing his legislative proposal.  Thus, consumers
were expected to bear the entire burden of the costs that the CAAA imposed on power plants in the
form of higher electricity prices.
The results with respect to the coal-mining firms, while not entirely conclusive, are in sharp
contrast to the electricity firms. Nine of 11 coal firms had a negative response to the events leading up
to the impending legislation, 3 significantly so. In addition, in each of the separate events analyzed, a
majority of firms were negatively affected by the event.  Most notably, only 1 of the 12 coal firms did
not have a negative CAR as a result of Bush’s June 12th speech and legislative submission.  Taken in
total, the results are suggestive that profits of coal-mining firms fell as a response to the increased
likelihood of acid rain legislation.  
These results underline the importance of evaluating the effect of environmental regulation on
firms and consumers on a case-by-case basis. If the coal mining industry is typical, financial markets
believe that environmental legislation imposing new costs lowers firm profits in industries facing without-21-
price controls and facing at least somewhat elastic demand.  However, in industries with rate-of-return
price regulation, financial markets believe this legislation has no impact on profits.  Consumers of these
industries’ products bear the entire cost of environmental compliance, making it more likely that these
costs will exceed the environmental benefits they enjoy.-22-
8/31/88:Bush positions himself as an environmentalist. He gives
the “Boston Harbor” speech the following day.
1/31/89: EPA Director William Reilly promises that acid rain
controls would be “first out of the box” from the White House.
2/9/89: To Congress, Bush promises that he will send legislation
for a “new, more effective Clean Air Act.”
6/12/89: Bush unveils his proposal, naming 107 specific plants.
7/21/89: Bush submits his proposal to Congress.
11/22/90: Conference Committee agrees on a compromise
between the House and Senate versions.
11/8/88: Bush wins election.
8/31/88:Bush positions himself as an environmentalist. He gives
the “Boston Harbor” speech the following day.
1/31/89: EPA Director William Reilly promises that acid rain
controls would be “first out of the box” from the White House.
2/9/89: To Congress, Bush promises that he will send legislation
for a “new, more effective Clean Air Act.”
6/12/89: Bush unveils his proposal, naming 107 specific plants.
7/21/89: Bush submits his proposal to Congress.
11/22/90: Conference Committee agrees on a compromise
between the House and Senate versions.
11/8/88: Bush wins election.
Figure 1: Timetable of Developments in Acid Rain Legislation










































Table 1: CAAA Event Windows
August 1988 -July 1989
Window 1:  Bush’s August 31st and September 1st, 1988  environmental campaign speeches     
Event window: August 24 - September 16, 1988.  
Window 2:  The presidential election of November 8th, 1988
Event window:  November 1st - November 22nd, 1988. 
Window 3:  Reilly’s January 31st, 1989 speech on the administration’s environmental
priorities at his confirmation hearings
Event window:  January 24 - February 14, 1989. 
Window 4.  Bush’s June 12th speech announcing his Clean Air legislative package, and its
subsequent July 21st submission
Event window:
Variant a: The speech plus 5 days before and 10 days after,  June 5th - June 26th, 1989.
Variant b:  5 days before the speech until 10 days after submission of the proposed legislation, June 5th
- August 4th, 1989. 
For all events, the estimation window is July 28, 1987 - August 23, 1988 (excluding October 6, 1987
through October 30, 1987, the period encompassing Black Monday that exhibited large swings in the
S&P 500 .)
Event windows include 5 trading days preceding and 10 days following the events themselves.  The
only exception was Variant b of Window 4, which for the coal industry extended only 6 trading days
beyond the July 21st  submission because of data availability.-25-
Table 2:  Summary of Results on CARs for Phase I Electricity Generating Companies
Predicted returns based on CNNfn Electric Utilities and S&P 500
All event windows include 5 days preceding and 10 days following main events.
31 Phase 1 Companies not integrated into coal industry 4 Phase 1 Companies integrated into coal industry




Separate CARs for each company Separate CARs for each company
negative CARs positive CARs  negative CARs positive CARs 
numbe
r
# 10% sig.       
(additional t>1) number
# 10% sig.       
(additional t>1) number
# 10% sig.       
(additional t>1) number
# 10% sig.       
(additional t>1)
All windows combined 0.0360 13 0   (1) 18 1   (1) 1 0   (0) 3 0   (0)
(0.0515)
Individual windows
1.       
    
Bush’s Aug. 31 & Sept.1,1988
environment campaign speeches  -0.0158 22 1   (4) 9 0   (1) 2 0   (0) 2 0   (0)
Aug. 24 - Sept. 16, 1988.  (.0220)
2.
Presidential election Nov. 8,
1988 -0.0065 14 0  (1) 17 0  (1) 2 0   (0) 2 0   (0)
 Nov. 1- Nov. 22, 1988.  (0.0214)
3.
Reilly’s Jan. 31, 1989  speech on
Bush environment priorities -0.0080 17 2   (1) 14 0   (1) 3 0   (0) 1 0   (0)
Jan. 24 - Feb. 14, 1989  (.0214)
4.
Bush’s June 12, 1989 speech on
CAAA  & July 21st submission
a.Speech window only 0.0307 8 0   (0) 23 0   (2) 2 0   (2) 2 0   (0)
June 5 - June 26, 1989 (.0213)
b.Speech through submission 0.0664 6 0   (0) 25 0   (4) 3 0   (0) 1 0   (0)
June 5 - August 4, 1989  (.0354)-26-
Table 3: Summary of Results on CARs for Coal Companies
Predicted returns based on S&P 500




Separate CARs for each company
negative CARs positive CARs 
Period and Main Events
number # 10% sig.       
(additional t>1)
number # 10% sig.       
(additional t>1)
out of 11 companies*                                  
All windows combined -0.2875 9 3   (2) 2 0   (0)
(0.2388)
Individual windows
1.     Bush’s Aug. 31 & 0.0622 8 0   (3) 3 0   (0)
Aug. 24 - Sept. 16, 1988.  (.1044)
out of 12 companies                                       
2. Presidential election Nov. 8, -0.0642 7 2  (2) 5 0   (0)
 Nov. 1- Nov. 22, 1988.  (0.1013)
3. Reilly’s Jan. 31, 1989 -0.1321 9 1   (0) 3 1   (0)
Jan. 24 - Feb. 14, 1989  (.1012)
4.
Bush’s June 12, 1989 speech
on clean air legislation & July
21st submission
a.Speech window only 0.0864 9 1   (1) 3 1   (0)
June 5 - June 26, 1989 (.1012)
b.Speech through legislative -0.0302 11 0   (4) 1 0   (1)
June 5 - August 4, 1989  (.1600)
*       Ashland Coal became a separate public firm in August 1988; it is included in counts for all windows following
Estimation windows are of necessity shorter for this company.-27-
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